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INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN FARRAKHAN V. GREGOIRE :
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S VOTING RIGHTS ACT STANDARD
“RESULTS IN” THE NEW JIM CROW
JONATHAN SGRO
Jarvious Cotton cannot vote. . . . Cotton’s family tree tells the
story of several generations of black men who were born in the
United States but who were denied the most basic freedom that
democracy promises—the freedom to vote for those who will
make the rules and laws that govern one’s life.  Cotton’s great-
great-grandfather could not vote as a slave.  His great-grandfather
was beaten to death by the Ku Klux Klan for attempting to vote.
His grandfather was prevented from voting by Klan intimidation.
His father was barred from voting by poll taxes and literacy tests.
Today, Jarvious Cotton cannot vote because he, like many black
men in the United States, has been labeled a felon and is cur-
rently on parole.1
I. INTRODUCTION
If current incarceration rates hold, three in ten of the next genera-
tion of African-American men will be disenfranchised at some point in
their lives.2  In states that disenfranchise ex-offenders, as many as forty
percent of African-American men will permanently lose their right to
vote.3  Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) with the
intent to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting.4  In part due to
1. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 1 (2010).  The “New Jim Crow” refers to the emergence of a
new racial undercaste as result of increased incarceration and legalized discrimina-
tion against those convicted. See generally id.
Jarvious Cotton was a plaintiff in Cotton v. Fordice. See Cotton v. Fordice, 157
F.3d 388, 389 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting Cotton’s claim was severed from other
appellant’s claim and dismissed).  The Fifth Circuit held in that case that a Missis-
sippi felon disenfranchisement provision was free of a racially discriminatory taint.
See id. at 391.
2. See SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2011), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
fd_bs_fdlawsinusDec11.pdf (noting prospective impact of felon disenfranchise-
ment on African-American men).
3. See id. (discussing future impact of felon disenfranchisement if current in-
carceration rates hold). See generally Christopher Uggen et al., Citizenship, Democ-
racy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 281 (2006) (analyzing size and scope of felon and ex-felon population,
consequences of felony convictions, and implications for crime and reintegration).
4. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) (“The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress’ [sic] firm intention to rid the country of
(139)
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the VRA, people of color are no longer subject to racial intimidation or
literacy tests at the ballot box; however, a more subtle and insidious mech-
anism has replaced these explicit methods to suppress the minority vote:
felon disenfranchisement.5
Forty-eight states maintain felon disenfranchisement laws—only
Maine and Vermont permit inmates to vote.6  These laws, like their racially
explicit predecessors, overwhelmingly affect people of color due to racial
bias in the criminal justice system.7  Presently, the United States imprisons
a larger percentage of its black population than did South Africa at the
height of Apartheid.8  In fact, roughly thirteen percent of African Ameri-
can men, or 1.4 million, are disenfranchised, a rate seven times the na-
tional average.9
racial discrimination in voting.”).  Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act (VRA)
pursuant to its enforcement power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
See id.  In addition to banning literacy tests and allowing federal monitoring of
elections, the VRA required covered jurisdictions to receive approval from the De-
partment of Justice for any changes to voting procedures. See Voting Rights Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b (2006)).  Section 2 of the VRA was not limited to covered jurisdictions,
but generally applied the language of the Fifteenth Amendment to all jurisdic-
tions: “No voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny
or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color.” Id. at 437 (codified as amended at § 1973(a)).
5. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 38-40 (discussing success of Civil Rights Act
and VRA in dismantling Jim Crow system of discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, employment, voting, education, and federally financed activities, and noting
that “[p]roponents of racial hierarchy found they could install a new racial caste
system without violating the law or the new limits of acceptable political discourse,
by demanding ‘law and order’ rather than ‘segregation forever’”).
6. See id. at 153 (discussing states that bar felons from voting and noting that
“[t]he vast majority of states continue to withhold the right to vote when prisoners
are released on parole” and “some states deny the right to vote for a period rang-
ing from a number of years to the rest of one’s life”); Marc Mauer, Felon Voting
Disenfranchisement: A Growing Collateral Consequence of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED.
SENT’G REP. 248, 248 (2000) (surveying state “patchwork” of felon disenfranchise-
ment laws); Developments in the Law, One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disen-
franchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1942 (2002) (discussing state felon
disenfranchisement laws).
7. See Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Current Issue, Disenfranchisement–-A Race Neutral
Punishment for Felony Offenders or a Way to Diminish the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL’Y 359, 361 (2002) (noting disparate impact of felon disenfranchise-
ment on African Americans); Caroline A. Newman, Note, Constitutional Problems
with Challenging State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
38 CONN. L. REV. 525, 527 (2006) (discussing racial impact of felon disenfranchise-
ment laws).  For a discussion of racial bias in the criminal justice system, see infra
notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
8. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing disparate impact of mass in-
carceration and War on Drugs on African Americans).
9. See SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 2 (discussing impact of felon disen-
franchisement on African-American men).
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Initially, advocates alarmed by the disparate impact of felon disen-
franchisement on racial minorities brought challenges under the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution.10  However, recent
efforts to invalidate felon disenfranchisement laws have focused on section
2 of the VRA.11  Section 2 provides that “[n]o voting qualification or pre-
requisite to voting . . . shall be imposed or applied . . . in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of
race or color.”12  Currently, federal circuit courts are divided over whether
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws are cognizable under section
2 of the VRA.13  In this sometimes rancorous division, the Ninth Circuit is
the only circuit to explicitly hold that it is permissible to challenge felon
disenfranchisement laws under the VRA.14  Nevertheless, in Farrakhan v.
Gregoire (Farrakhan III),15 the Ninth Circuit recently revised its previous
holding en banc and required plaintiffs bringing a section 2 claim alleging
racial bias in the criminal justice system to show intentional discrimination
in that system or in the challenged law’s passage.16  The Supreme Court
has not considered a challenge to felon disenfranchisement under section
2, but its decisions on vote dilution claims under the VRA provide insight
into the Court’s understanding of the Act and the framework for success-
ful challenges.17
This Note (i) argues that the Ninth Circuit’s intentional discrimina-
tion requirement directly contradicts the language of the VRA’s 1982
amendments and (ii) suggests a formulation of section 2’s results test that
aligns with precedent under the VRA and the Court’s disparate impact
jurisprudence.18  Part II briefly outlines the history of felon disen-
franchisement laws in the United States and the current racial bias in the
criminal justice system, and Part III provides an overview of challenges
under section 2 of the VRA.19  Part IV discusses the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
10. For a discussion of early challenges to felon disenfranchisement, see infra
notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of recent challenges to felon disenfranchisement, see in-
fra notes 62-117 and accompanying text.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
13. For a discussion of federal appellate decisions on felon disenfranchise-
ment, see infra notes 62-117 and accompanying text.
14. See Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan III), 623 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (affirming previous holding that felon disenfranchisement
laws may be challenged under section 2 of VRA).
15. 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
16. See id. at 994 (holding that plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination
in operation of criminal justice system or enactment of law).
17. For a discussion of vote dilution cases, see infra notes 42-61 and accompa-
nying text.
18. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179
(“This amendment is designed to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is
not required to establish a violation of Section 2.”).
19. For a discussion of the history of felon disenfranchisement in the United
States and racial bias in the criminal justice system, see infra notes 23-33 and ac-
companying text.  For a discussion of challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws
3
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sion in Farrakhan III, while Part V analyzes the court’s novel evidentiary
standard.20  Part VI suggests the appropriate evidentiary standard for as-
sessing felon disenfranchisement laws under section 2.21  Part VII con-
cludes with a discussion of the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision on
future challenges to felon disenfranchisement and the Court’s interpreta-
tion of section 2.22
II. LEGAL DISCRIMINATION AND RACIAL BIAS IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Felon disenfranchisement laws in the United States may be traced to
ancient and medieval legal codes.23  Between 1776 and 1821, eleven states
disqualified criminals from voting.24  By 1868, this number jumped to
twenty-nine.25  As the Civil War approached, disenfranchisement laws dis-
qualified numerous groups from voting, including women, men without
extended residency, African Americans, soldiers, students, the institution-
alized mentally ill, and criminals.26  Today, only the institutionalized men-
tally ill and criminals remain barred.27  After Reconstruction, many
southern states re-drafted their criminal disenfranchisement laws with the
clear intent of disqualifying African Americans from voting and achieved
under the Fourteenth Amendment and section 2 of the VRA, see infra notes 34-85
and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of Farrakhan III and an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, see infra notes 86-132 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of a section 2 standard that accords with the language of
the VRA and precedent, see infra notes 133-67 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the impact of Farrakhan III on future challenges under
section 2 of the VRA, see infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Dis-
enfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059-66 (discussing
historical roots of felon disenfranchisement laws); R. Gregory Jerald, Comment,
Modern Day Discrimination or a Valid Exercise of States’ Rights?: The Circuits Split as to
Whether the Federal Voting Rights Act Applies to State Felon Disenfranchisement Statutes, 7
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 141, 148 (2005) (discussing history of felon disenfranchise-
ment); see also Ewald, supra, at 1061 (“English colonists in North America trans-
planted much of the mother country’s common law regarding the civil disabilities
of convicts, and supplemented it with statutes regarding suffrage.”); Mauer, supra
note 6, at 248 (“Felon disenfranchisement laws in the U.S. have their origins in the
‘civil death’ practices applied to ‘infamous’ offenders in medieval Europe and later
in a variety of civil disabilities imposed on offenders in England.”).
24. See Ewald, supra note 23, at 1063 (discussing disenfranchisement of
criminals in colonial era).  Some have attributed the increased prevalence of felon
disenfranchisement to an effort to limit the political strength of lower class groups.
See id. at 1064.
25. See id. (discussing disenfranchisement in early United States history).
26. See id. (discussing disenfranchised groups prior to Civil War); Mauer,
supra note 6, at 248-49 (discussing groups excluded from electoral process).
27. See Mauer, supra note 6, at 248-49 (discussing historically disenfranchised
groups).
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rapid success.28  Today, although racial animus is less explicit and there
are many arguments defending felon disenfranchisement, similar discrimi-
natory effects continue.29
Presently, statistical disparities in policing, prosecution, and sentenc-
ing between whites and minorities relative to population figures reveal
alarming evidence of racial bias in the criminal justice system.30  The War
on Drugs has exacerbated the effect of felon disenfranchisement on mi-
nority populations and has mirrored the discriminatory history of many
felon disenfranchisement laws.31  Despite overwhelming evidence of racial
28. See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 23, at 1065 (discussing intentionally discrimina-
tory criminal disenfranchisement provisions after Reconstruction); Dugree-Pear-
son, supra note 7, at 361 (“[S]ome southern states in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries narrowly tailored their disenfranchisement laws to preclude those con-
victed of crimes thought to be disproportionately committed by African Americans
. . . .”); Jerald, supra note 23, at 149 (discussing effort among certain southern
states to blunt effect of Fifteenth Amendment through use of literacy tests, poll
taxes, and grandfather clauses).  For example, in Mississippi, almost seventy per-
cent of eligible African Americans were registered to vote, but two years after the
state’s constitutional convention in 1890, less than six percent were eligible to vote.
See Jerald, supra note 23, at 150.
29. See, e.g., Jerald, supra note 23, at 150 (noting “staggering effects felon dis-
enfranchisement statutes continue to have on the black vote”); see also Note, The
Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and ‘the Purity of the Ballot Box’,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1301 (1989) (discussing policy justifications for felon dis-
enfranchisement).  Two primary concerns have been advanced to justify felon dis-
enfranchisement: (1) “fear that ex-convicts might use their votes to alter the
content or administration of the criminal law” and (2) the “belief that disqualifica-
tion of former felons is necessary to guard against vote fraud and related election
offenses.” See id. at 1302-03.  Additional theoretical justifications rely on the under-
standing that felons have broken the social contract and “only the virtuous are
morally competent to participate in governing society.” See id. at 1304.  Commen-
tators have noted that the former justification is incompatible with broader, more
modern conceptions of social contract intended “to promote human freedom and
development,” while the latter notion, which relies on civic republicanism’s exclu-
sionary aspect, “is inconsistent with modern society’s commitment to equality and
inclusion.” See id. at 1306-08.  Instead, commentators argue that disenfranchise-
ment is an “act of communal self-delusion” by which society localizes blame for
crime in the individual “to obscure the complexity of the roots of crime” and the
culpability of contingent social structures. See id. at 1312-13 (asserting that
“criminals in our society are permanent outsiders, and the effort to oppose them is
understood as a ‘war on crime’” and “[d]isenfranchisement is an ideal vehicle for
dramatic illustration of the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ because one of the
main functions of the struggle against ‘out-groups’ is to ‘bring into consciousness
basic norms governing rights and duties of citizens’” (quoting LEWIS A. COSER,
THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 127 (1956))).
30. See generally David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially
Biased Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 101 (2007) (noting
that African Americans suffer from “severe disproportional representation” in all
phases of criminal justice process).  Racial discrimination is most visible in police
practices such as vehicle and pedestrian stops, as well as detentions and searches.
See id. at 102 (discussing statistical disparity based on race in stops and seizures on
New Jersey Turnpike and in Philadelphia and New York City).
31. See Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002) (noting that collat-
5
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disparity, challenges to discrimination in the criminal justice system face
numerous obstacles.32  Nevertheless, some commentators argue that in-
creased incarceration rates and successful innocence claims provide a
unique opportunity to challenge racial discrimination in the criminal jus-
tice system.33
III. CHALLENGES TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS: FROM UNEQUAL
PROTECTION TO MIXED RESULTS
Early challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws predominately in-
volved claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.34  In
Richardson v. Ramirez,35 the U.S. Supreme Court held that such challenges
could not survive because the Fourteenth Amendment’s language ap-
proved of felon disenfranchisement.36  Soon thereafter, in Hunter v. Under-
eral consequences of conviction such as felon disenfranchisement parallel meth-
ods used during Jim Crow Era, and some categories of behavior like drug use were
criminalized in part due to association with minority groups).  For example, some
thought that cocaine enabled African Americans to withstand bullets and stimu-
lated sexual assault, and some feared that smoking opium encouraged sexual con-
tact between Chinese and white Americans. See id. at 257.  Data measuring the
effect of the War on Drugs indicates shocking racial disparities: in 2000, over two
million people were in prison, jail, or other form of detention, and while African
Americans only accounted for 12.9% of the population, they represented 46.2% of
those incarcerated. See id. at 262.
32. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 31, at 266 (“Complying with the requests of the
U.S. Department of Justice, the federal courts have made it quite difficult to obtain
discovery of information that might demonstrate that decisions to prosecute were
based on racial discrimination.”); Rudovsky, supra note 30, at 106-20 (arguing that
“the Fourth Amendment provides virtually no protection against racially discrimi-
natory stops and searches” and “the Equal Protection Clause requires a showing of
intentional racial discrimination before a court may consider legal remedies”). See
generally ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 95-136 (discussing Supreme Court precedent
preventing challenges to racial bias in criminal justice system and concluding that
“[t]he Supreme Court has now closed the courthouse doors to claims of racial bias
at every stage of the criminal justice process, from stops and searches to plea bar-
gaining and sentencing”).
33. See Rudovsky, supra note 30, at 120-21 ( “The time is ripe to re-conceptual-
ize the functioning of the criminal justice system, and eliminating the insidious
influence of race should be high on the reform list.”)
34. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 224 (1985) (considering
challenge to provision of Alabama’s constitution that disenfranchised persons con-
victed of any crime involving “moral turpitude” under Fourteenth Amendment);
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (considering ex-felons’ challenge to
California law that denied individuals convicted of “infamous crimes” right to vote
under Equal Protection Clause).
35. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
36. See id. at 43 (holding that language in Fourteenth Amendment gives tacit
approval of felon disenfranchisement).  In Richardson, the Supreme Court held
that an equal protection challenge could not survive because the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively permitted the disenfranchisement of felons.
See id. (agreeing that framers of Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended
to prohibit in Section 1 that which was expressly exempted by Section 2).  The
majority relied upon the fact that despite numerous changes in the language of
Section 2, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment never altered the language,
6
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wood,37 the Court invalidated an Alabama felon disenfranchisement law
upon a clear showing of purposeful discrimination in the law’s enact-
ment.38  While plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of felon disen-
franchisement laws, members of racial minority groups also challenged
state apportionment plans under the Equal Protection Clause.39  Ulti-
mately, the Court’s apportionment jurisprudence instigated amendments
to the VRA that explicitly rejected a requirement of intentional discrimi-
nation.40  Because this lowered the evidentiary burden, recent challenges
have attacked felon disenfranchisement under section 2 of the VRA.41
“except for participation in rebellion, or other crime.” See id. at 45 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  In his dissent, Justice Marshall rejected the majority’s reli-
ance upon Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment because Section 2 had the
limited purpose of providing “a special remedy–-reduced representation-–to cure a
particular form of electoral abuse—the disenfranchisement of Negroes.” See id. at
74, 76 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress did not approve all election
practices to which Section 2 was inapplicable and such practices were not immu-
nized “from evolving standards of equal protection scrutiny”).
37. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
38. See id. at 233 (holding that felon disenfranchisement laws may not be used
to purposefully discriminate against racial minorities).  In Hunter, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the drafters of the disenfranchisement law “intentionally adopted” the
misdemeanors identified in the provision to disenfranchise African-American vot-
ers on account of their race. See id. at 224.  The plaintiffs also asserted that the
provision had such an effect. See id.  Recognizing little dispute that the drafters
sought to establish white supremacy in the state, the Court found sufficient evi-
dence of racially discriminatory motive to invalidate the statute. See id. at 228-33
(rejecting defendant’s argument that original intent of enactment was irrelevant as
clearly contradictory to Court’s equal protection jurisprudence).
39. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (establishing cri-
teria for demonstrating that voting devices resulted in unequal access to electoral
process); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61, 65 (1980) (holding that section
2 of VRA has same effect as Fifteenth Amendment and both require showings of
discriminatory purpose), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134, as recognized in Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30; White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (holding that Texas legislative redistricting
plan may be invalidated where multimember districts are “used invidiously to can-
cel out or minimize the voting strength of racial groups”); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124, 143 (1971) (holding that “validity of multi-member districts [are] justicia-
ble . . . where the circumstances of a particular case may ‘operate to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting popula-
tion’” (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965))).  For a further discus-
sion of these apportionment cases, see infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
40. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35 (“Congress substantially revised § 2 to make
clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and
to establish as the relevant legal standard the ‘results test,’ applied by this Court in
White v. Regester, and by other federal courts before Bolden.” (citations omitted)).
41. See, e.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 34-36 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding
that VRA provides no cause of action against state law that disenfranchises incar-
cerated felons because such laws are deeply rooted in United States history and
Constitution), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 412 (2010); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305,
329 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that Congress did not intend VRA to apply
to felon disenfranchisement laws and made no clear statement of intent to modify
federal balance by applying VRA to such laws); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405
F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that section 2 of VRA does
7
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A. Pre-amendment Vote Dilution Claims
The Supreme Court considered whether legislative apportionment
plans were invidiously discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in both Whitcomb v. Chavis42 and White v.
Regester.43  To sustain such claims, the Court stated that plaintiffs maintain
the burden to show that the political processes leading to legislators’
nominations and elections “were not equally open to participation by the
group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.”44  In both cases, the Court considered the dilu-
tive effect of the redistricting plans in light of the cultural and economic
realities of the minority groups, including the continuing effects of invidi-
ous discrimination in areas such as education, employment, economics,
health, and politics.45  The Court in Whitcomb and White considered the
totality of the circumstances to determine both access to the political pro-
cess and discriminatory purpose.46
not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws because contrary holding would con-
flict with Fourteenth Amendment); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir.
1986) (holding that Tennessee statute did not violate VRA).
42. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).  The plaintiffs in Whitcomb challenged an Indiana
legislative apportionment plan alleging it “invidiously diluted the force and effect
of the vote of Negroes and poor persons living within . . . ‘the ghetto area.’” See id.
at 128-29.
43. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).  The plaintiffs in White challenged a Texas legislative
redistricting plan alleging it “operated to dilute the voting strength of racial and
ethnic minorities.” See id. at 758-59.
44. Id. at 765-66.  The Court concluded that it is insufficient to show that the
racial minority group “has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting po-
tential.” See id. (discussing burden of proof for “claims that multimember districts
are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial
groups”).
45. See id. at 767-70 (surveying past and present condition of Mexican Ameri-
cans in Bexar County); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149-50 (noting absence of evidence
that African Americans “were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the politi-
cal party they desired to support, to participate in its affairs or to be equally repre-
sented on those occasions when legislative candidates were chosen”).
46. See White, 412 U.S. at 765 (“[W]e have entertained claims that multimem-
ber districts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting
strength of racial groups.”); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149 (“[T]he courts have been
vigilant in scrutinizing schemes allegedly conceived or operated as purposeful de-
vices to further racial discrimination.”).  Addressing the disestablishment of the
multimember district in Bexar County, the White Court first recognized Mexican
Americans in Bexar County as an identifiable class for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes that had “long ‘suffered from, and continue[d] to suffer from, the results
and effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the fields of education,
employment, economics, health, politics and others.’” See White, 412 U.S. at 767-68
(citation omitted).  The Court also noted that Mexican Americans suffered from
“a cultural and language barrier [making] participation in community processes
extremely difficult.” Id. at 768.  The Court stressed “that Mexican-American voting
registration remained very poor in the county and that, only five Mexican-Ameri-
cans since 1880 have served in the Texas Legislature from Bexar County.” Id. at
768-69.  The Court also noted that “the Bexar County legislative delegation in the
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss1/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-1\VLR105.txt unknown Seq: 9  9-MAY-12 15:26
2012] NOTE 147
Similarly, in City of Mobile v. Bolden,47 the Court extended its pur-
poseful discrimination requirement to alleged violations of the VRA.48
The plaintiffs alleged that the practice of electing city commissioners at-
large unfairly diluted the voting strength of African Americans in violation
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as section 2 of the
VRA.49  Finding that Congress did not intend section 2 to add anything to
the Fifteenth Amendment, the plurality viewed the claims as duplicative.50
Proceeding with its analysis under the Fifteenth Amendment, the plurality
held that the Amendment only prohibits “purposefully discriminatory de-
nial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote ‘on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’”51  In dissent, Justice
House was insufficiently responsive to Mexican-American interests.” Id. at 769.
The Court acknowledged that the district court arrived at its decision “based on
the totality of the circumstances” and stated:
[W]e are not inclined to overturn these findings [that the multimember
district in Bexar County invidiously excluded Mexican Americans from
effective participation in political life], representing as they do a blend of
history and an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the
Bexar County multimember district in the light of past and present real-
ity, political and otherwise.
Id. at 769-70.
47. 446 U.S. 55 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134, as recognized in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986).
48. See id. (challenging city’s at-large method of electing commissioners
under Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and VRA).
49. See id. at 58 (discussing background and procedural history).  In 1911, the
Alabama legislature authorized large municipalities to adopt a commission form of
government. See id. at 59.  Mobile established a city commission in the same year
and has continued to maintain the system. See id.  “[E]ach candidate for the Mo-
bile City Commission runs for election in the city at-large for a term of four years
in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected only by a majority of the total
vote.” See id. at 59-60.
50. See id. at 58, 60-61 (“[I]t is apparent that the language of § 2 no more than
elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and . . . it was intended to have
an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.” (footnote
omitted)).
51. Id. at 65 (finding no Fifteenth Amendment violation where African Amer-
icans “‘register and vote without hindrance’”).  The Court relied upon precedent
requiring racially discriminatory motivation to prove a violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. See id. at 62-63 (concluding that “plaintiffs failed to prove that the
legislature ‘was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the dis-
tricts on racial lines’” and “that in the absence of such an invidious purpose, a
State is constitutionally free to redraw political boundaries in any manner it
chooses” (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56 (1964))).  Addressing the
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Court held that “ ‘[p]roof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.’” Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)).  Additionally, the
Court rejected a reading of White that allowed a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment due to diluted voting strength of a discrete group without a showing
of discriminatory intent. See id. at 68.  The Court also rejected the court of ap-
peals’s understanding that “a plaintiff may establish this illicit purpose [ ] by ad-
ducing evidence” that satisfies the factors announced in Zimmer v. McKeithen. Id. at
9
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White objected to the plurality’s opinion for its erroneous neglect of the
principle that invidious discriminatory purpose can be inferred from ob-
jective factors like those relied upon in White.52  While Bolden appeared to
close the door to challenges absent clear discriminatory purpose, Con-
gress acted quickly to eliminate any such requirement.53
B. 1982 Amendments to the VRA
Following the Court’s decision in Bolden, Congress amended the VRA
in 1982 “to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required
to establish a violation of Section 2.”54  Instead, Congress adopted the re-
sults test, which required that “[n]o voting qualification . . . or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a man-
ner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen . . . to
vote on account of race or color.”55  While some argue that the amend-
ment focused on vote dilution claims like the challenges to apportionment
plans in Whitcomb and White, the Court has held that the results test applies
to both vote dilution and vote denial claims.56  Tracking the factors con-
72; see also id. at 73 (“Although the presence of the indicia relied on in Zimmer may
afford some evidence of a discriminatory purpose, satisfaction of those criteria is
not of itself sufficient proof of such a purpose.”).
52. See id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting) (finding that invidious discriminatory
purpose may be inferred from totality of facts).  Justice White argued that the dis-
trict court and court of appeals properly adhered to the admonition that “ ‘[t]he
plaintiffs’ burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participa-
tion by the group in question.’” Id. at 97 (alteration in original) (quoting White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973)).  Justice White faulted the plurality for ignor-
ing the facts deemed relevant in White and Whitcomb to the question of whether
purposeful discrimination may be inferred: “a lack of minority access to the candi-
date selection process, unresponsiveness of elected officials to minority interests, a
history of discrimination, majority vote requirements, provisions that candidates
run for positions by place or number, [and] the lack of any provision for at-large
candidates to run from particular geographical subdistricts.” See id. at 101, 103
(asserting that by viewing factors in isolation, plurality rejected totality of circum-
stances approach); see also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 177 (1971) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he test for multi-member districts is whether there are invidi-
ous effects.”).
53. For a discussion of the 1982 amendments to the VRA, see infra notes 54-61
and accompanying text.
54. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179
(rejecting intent requirement); see also Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan II), 590
F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir.) (discussing 1982 amendment to VRA), aff’d in part, over-
ruled in part en banc by 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (emphasis added) (stating results test).
56. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 394 (1991) (“[P]laintiffs can prevail
under § 2 by demonstrating that a challenged election practice has resulted in the
denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on color or race.”); Daniel P.
Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C.
L. REV. 689, 705 (2006) (“The [Senate] hearings focused on whether replacing the
Bolden test with a results test would effectively mandate proportional representa-
tion . . . .”).
10
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sidered in the Court’s apportionment cases, the Senate Report on the
1982 amendments included “typical factors” (the Senate Factors) that
courts may consider to determine whether, under the totality of circum-
stances, a challenged voting practice results in the denial or abridgement
of the right to vote on account of race.57  Notably, the fifth Senate Factor
inquires into “the extent to which members of the minority group in the
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such ar-
eas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process.”58
The Court first had the opportunity to interpret the amendments to
the VRA in Thornburg v. Gingles.59 Addressing a vote dilution claim, the
plurality provided an extensive overview of the 1982 amendments and con-
cluded that “[t]he essence of a [section] 2 claim is that a certain electoral
law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to
57. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (discussing Senate Factors).  The Senate
Factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or politi-
cal subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority
group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic
process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political sub-
division is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusu-
ally large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot
provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to partici-
pate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or sub-
tle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected
to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of
plaintiffs’ evidence to establish a violation are:
Whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minor-
ity group.
Whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of
such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.
Id. (footnotes omitted).  The Senate Report emphasized that “there is no require-
ment that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them
point one way or the other,” and that, “[w]hile these enumerated factors will often
be the most relevant ones, in some cases other factors will be indicative of the
alleged dilution.” Id. at 29.
58. Id. at 24.
59. 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (challenging North Carolina redistricting scheme as
impairment of African-American citizens’ ability to elect representatives of choice
under Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and section 2 of VRA).
11
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cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters
to elect their preferred representatives.”60  Ultimately, granting deference
to the district court due to its acquaintance with local political realities,
the plurality affirmed the lower court’s holding that North Carolina’s use
of a multimember electoral structure caused African-American voters in
the districts to have less opportunity than white voters to elect representa-
tives of their choice.61
C. Post-amendment Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Under Section 2
Due to the relaxed legal standard codified in the 1982 amendments
to the VRA and affirmed in subsequent vote dilution cases, hopeful chal-
lengers to felon disenfranchisement laws began to seek relief under sec-
tion 2 of the VRA.62  However, the clarity Congress intended has
diminished as federal appellate courts have split in interpreting section
60. Id. at 47 (plurality opinion) (discussing totality of circumstances test as
applied to multimember district and at-large voting schemes).  The plurality noted
that Congress repudiated the intent test for three principle reasons: (1) “it is ‘un-
necessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of individual
officials or entire communities,’” (2) “it places an ‘inordinately difficult’ burden of
proof on plaintiffs,” and (3) “it ‘asks the wrong question.’” Id. at 44 (quoting S.
REP. NO. 97-417, at 36).  According to the Senate Report, the proper question “is
whether ‘as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have
an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candi-
dates of their choice.’” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28).  Addressing the
Senate Factors, the plurality noted that the factors are pertinent to certain types of
section 2 violations, particularly vote dilution claims, but other factors also may be
relevant. See id. at 45 (emphasizing that that “ ‘the question whether the political
processes are ‘equally open’ depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the
‘past and present reality,’ and on a ‘functional’ view of the political process.’”
(quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30).  Additionally, the plurality articulated a num-
ber of circumstances necessary for multimember districts to impair minority vot-
ers’ ability to elect representatives of their choice:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district. . . .  Second, the minority group must be able to show
that it is politically cohesive. . . .  Third, the minority must be able to
demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable
it–-in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candi-
date running unopposed–-usually to defeat the minority’s preferred
candidate.
Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
61. See id. at 80 (affirming lower court’s evaluation of totality of circumstances
in which “racially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimination in voting
matters, education, housing, employment, and health services; and the persistence
of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted in concert with the multimember
districting scheme to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically
cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the political process and to
elect candidates of their choice”).
62. For a discussion of challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws under sec-
tion 2 of the VRA, see infra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
12
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2.63  Nevertheless, in addition to challenges to felon disenfranchisement
laws, a number of circuit courts have heard other claims under section 2
that may elucidate the statute’s evidentiary standard.64
In the first challenge to reach a federal appellate court, the Sixth Cir-
cuit did not object to the use of section 2 of the VRA to challenge felon
disenfranchisement.65  In Wesley v. Collins,66 an African-American citizen
who pleaded guilty to being an accessory to larceny challenged Tennes-
see’s felon disenfranchisement provision under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments as well as section 2.67  The court acknowledged that
63. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding felon disenfranchisement challenge cognizable under section
2 of VRA); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1259-63 (6th Cir. 1986) (assessing
challenge to Tennessee felon disenfranchisement statute under section 2 of VRA,
but finding no violation). But see Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir.
2009) (rejecting challenge to felon disenfranchisement under VRA because such
laws are deeply rooted in United States history and Constitution), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 412 (2010); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 328 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(holding that Congress did not intend VRA to apply to felon disenfranchisement
laws and made no clear statement of intent to modify federal balance by applying
VRA to such laws); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (holding that section 2 of VRA does not apply to felon disen-
franchisement laws because contrary holding would conflict with Fourteenth
Amendment).
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist.,
109 F.3d 586, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that requirement that voters own
real property within boundaries of district to vote in district elections did not vio-
late section 2 of VRA, agreeing with district court conclusion that “ ‘the observed
differences in rate of home ownership between non-Hispanic whites and African-
Americans is not substantially explained by race, but is better explained by other
factors independent of race’”); Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm’rs
Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 314-15, 323 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
Pennsylvania law requiring voters who fail to vote after two years be purged from
voting rolls did not violate section 2 of VRA because plaintiffs’ evidence “failed to
demonstrate that ‘the purge law is the dispositive force in depriving minority voters of
equal access to the political process’” (citation omitted)); Salas v. Sw. Tex. Junior
Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1555-56 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that at-large district did
not violate section 2 of VRA because plaintiffs offered no evidence linking low
voter turnout to past official discrimination); Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889
F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that state’s appointive system for se-
lecting school board members did not violate section 2 of VRA because evidence
of underrepresentation of African Americans on school board in relation to gen-
eral population and underrepresentation in governing bodies that appoint school
board members did not suffice to prove discriminatory effect); see also Tokaji, supra
note 56, at 709-13 (discussing vote denial cases, including challenges to voting
equipment and voter identification).
65. See Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1259 (“The Voting Rights Act secures not only the
opportunity for all qualified citizens to cast their ballot, but also guarantees that an
individual’s vote will not be diluted.”).
66. 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
67. See id. at 1257 (discussing procedural history).  The Tennessee Voting
Rights Act of 1981 provided that:
(1) No person who has been convicted of an infamous crime, as defined
by § 40-20-112, in this state shall be permitted to register to vote or vote at
any election unless he shall have been pardoned by the governor, or his
13
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Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement provision disproportionately im-
pacted African Americans due to significantly higher conviction rates com-
pared to whites.68  It then stated, “such a showing merely directs the
court’s inquiry into the interaction of the challenged legislation ‘with
those historical, social and political factors generally probative of dilu-
tion.’”69  After noting a history of discrimination with continuing present-
day effects, the court held that other social and political factors, such as
the state’s legitimate purpose for enacting the statute, led to the conclu-
sion that there was no violation of the VRA.70
After Wesley, a circuit split on the issue emerged.71  Nearly twenty
years later, the Eleventh Circuit held that allowing challenges to felon dis-
enfranchisement laws under the VRA would place the statute in direct
conflict with the affirmative sanction of the Fourteenth Amendment.72  In
full rights of citizenship have otherwise been restored as prescribed by
law.
Id. at 1258 n.3 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-143 (1981), held unconstitutional by
May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340 (Tenn. 2008)).  The court noted that the review to
determine whether “challenged legislation results in vote dilution under Section 2
based on the ‘totality of the circumstances’ requires a highly individualistic in-
quiry.” See id. at 1260 (noting “results test” and Senate Factors).
68. See id. at 1261 (noting disproportionate impact on African Americans).
69. Id. (quoting Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 354 (E.D.N.C. 1984),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)).
70. See id. (holding that state may constitutionally disenfranchise felons).  The
court asserted that felons are not “disenfranchised because of an immutable char-
acteristic, such as race, but rather because of their conscious decision to commit a
criminal act for which they assume the risks of detention and punishment.” Id. at
1262.
71. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (observing that claim that Florida’s felon disenfranchisement law violates
section 2 raises important question of statutory interpretation and that circuits are
split).
72. See id. at 1229 (holding that felon disenfranchisement has “affirmative
sanction” of Fourteenth Amendment).  Relying on Richardson’s interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the court concluded that it could not construe the
VRA in a way that “create[s] a constitutional question unless there is a clear state-
ment from Congress endorsing this understanding.” See id. (stating that interpre-
tation of VRA that recognized challenges to felon disenfranchisement would place
statute outside of Congress’s enforcement power).  Additionally, the court ob-
served that legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend the VRA to
reach felon disenfranchisement provisions in 1965 and made no mention of such
provisions in 1982 when the statute was amended. See id. at 1232-34.
However, four of the twelve judges, in three separate opinions, rejected the
majority’s analysis and found that racially discriminatory provisions are cognizable
under section 2 of the VRA. See id. at 1235-51 (arguing that racially discriminatory
felon disenfranchisement laws are cognizable under VRA).  In a concurring opin-
ion, Judge Tjoflat argued that if plaintiffs could support the claim that racial bias
in the criminal justice system interacts with the state’s felon disenfranchisement
provision to disadvantage minority voters, “they might demonstrate the sort of
causal connection between racial bias and disparate effect necessary to make out a
vote-denial claim.” See id. at 1239 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).  Similarly, Judge Barkett
found that the plain language of section 2 of the VRA unambiguously applies to
felon disenfranchisement and “[t]he majority’s finding of a conflict between the
14
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Johnson v. Governor of Florida,73 the plaintiffs filed a class action under the
Fourteenth Amendment and section 2 of the VRA on behalf of all Florida
citizens who had been convicted of a felony and thus had been barred
from voting under the state’s felon disenfranchisement law.74  Relying
upon Richardson and Hunter, the court found insufficient evidence of ra-
cial animus in the disenfranchisement provision’s enactment to establish
an Equal Protection Clause violation.75
After an extensive review of the VRA’s legislative history, the Second
Circuit soon joined the Eleventh Circuit in its interpretation of the VRA,
holding that Congress did not intend that the Act encompass felon disen-
franchisement provisions.76  In Hayden v. Pataki,77 African-American and
Latino inmates challenged New York’s felon disenfranchisement statute
under the VRA.78  While the court noted that such statutes are presump-
VRA and Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment stems from its failure to distin-
guish between felon disenfranchisement laws generally and those that result in
racial discrimination.” Id. at 1248 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
73. 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
74. See id. at 1216-17 (discussing plaintiffs’ claim).  Florida’s felon disen-
franchisement law—a constitutional provision—provides that “[n]o person con-
victed of a felony . . . shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of
civil rights or removal of disability.” FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
75. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1217-27 (discussing plaintiff’s claim “that racial
animus motivated the adoption of Florida’s criminal disenfranchisement provision
in 1868 and this animus remains legally operative today, notwithstanding the fact
that Florida altered and reenacted the provision in 1968”).  After noting differ-
ences between the 1868 and 1968 versions of Florida’s disenfranchisement law,
particularly the narrowing of the prohibition to only those convicted of felonies,
the court found that Florida would have enacted the provision without impermissi-
ble motive. See id. at 1220-24.  Furthermore, the court determined that Florida in
fact did enact the provision without an impermissible motive. See id.
76. See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 316 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding
that VRA does not cover felon disenfranchisement provisions).
77. 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc).
78. See id. at 305 (discussing plaintiffs’ claims).  The court consolidated two
cases for oral argument. See id. at 309 (noting consolidation of Muntaqim v.
Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004), and Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 Civ.
8586(LMM), 2004 WL 1335921 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004)).  Muntaqim, an African-
American inmate, filed a pro se complaint in 1994 that alleged that “New York
Election Law § 5-106 violates the [VRA] because ‘it results in a denial or abridge-
ment of the right . . . to vote on account of race.’” See id. at 310 (alteration in
original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006)).  The Hayden complaint named
twenty-one plaintiffs currently incarcerated or paroled challenging “‘New York
State’s unconstitutional and discriminatory practice of denying suffrage to persons
who are incarcerated or on parole for a felony conviction and the resulting dis-
criminatory impact that such denial of suffrage has on Blacks and Latinos in the
State.’” Id. at 311.  New York Election Law § 5-106 states:
2. No person who has been convicted of a felony pursuant to the laws of
this state, shall have the right to register for or vote at any election unless
he shall have been pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by
the governor, or his maximum sentence of imprisonment has expired, or
he has been discharged from parole.
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106 (McKinney 2011).
15
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tively constitutional, it cited several factors in finding reason to explore
the VRA’s purpose in addition to the plain language of the statute, which
the court admitted “could be read to include felon disenfranchisement
provisions.”79  The court particularly emphasized the clear statement rule,
which provides that unless Congress makes it “unmistakably clear” of con-
trary intention in the text of a statute, a court may look to the context of
the statute’s enactment or its legislative history to find evidence that Con-
gress did not intend to alter the federal balance.80
79. See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 315-16 (listing reasons to conclude that Congress
did not intend to include felon disenfranchisement provisions within coverage of
VRA).  The reasons that the court considered include:
(1) the explicit approval given such laws in the Fourteenth Amendment;
(2) the long history and continuing prevalence of felon disenfranchise-
ment provisions throughout the United States; (3) the statements in the
House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports and on the Senate floor
explicitly excluding felon disenfranchisement laws from provisions of the
statute; (4) the absence of any affirmative consideration of felon disen-
franchisement laws during either the 1965 passage of the Act or its 1982
revision; (5) the introduction thereafter of bills specifically intended to
include felon disenfranchisement provisions within the VRA’s coverage;
(6) the enactment of a felon disenfranchisement statute for the District
of Columbia by Congress soon after the passage of the Voting Rights Act;
and (7) the subsequent passage of statutes designed to facilitate the re-
moval of convicted felons from the voting rolls.
Id. (footnote omitted).
80. See id. at 323, 325 (stating that courts should assume that Congress did not
intend to alter federal balance and that clear statement rule (or plain statement
rule) “requires Congress to make its intent ‘unmistakably clear’ when enacting
statutes that would alter the usual constitutional balance between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States” (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Second Circuit acknowledged that the
Court in Gregory noted “that ‘the principle it articulated did not apply when a stat-
ute was unambiguous.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52,
60 (1997)). But see id. at 325 (“[W]e will apply the clear statement rule when a
statute admits of an interpretation that would alter the federal balance but there is
reason to believe, either from the text of the statute, the context of its enactment,
or its legislative history, that Congress may not have intended such an alteration of
the federal balance.”).  The court concluded that, despite the “broad and general
language” of the statute, Congress would “have specified that felon disenfranchise-
ment provisions are covered by the [VRA] if that were its intent.” Id. at 325-26.
The five dissenting judges rejected the majority’s view that the statute was am-
biguous. See id. at 346 (Parker, Jr., J., dissenting) (“In order to justify its failure to
apply the plain language of VRA § 2, the majority must find ambiguity in that
provision’s pellucid language.”); id. at 368 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Section 2
of the Act by its unambiguous terms subjects felony disenfranchisement and all
other voting qualifications to its coverage.”); id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (“I be-
lieve that this language of the Voting Rights Act is facially unambiguous . . . .”).
The dissenters also rejected the majority’s interpretation of the legislative history.
See id. at 345 (Parker, Jr., J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that felon disenfranchisement
statutes may sometimes be constitutional does not mean they are always constitu-
tional.”); id. at 365 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“The fact that race-neutral felon
disenfranchisement is permissible under § 4(c) tells us nothing at all about
whether § 2 allows racially discriminatory felon disenfranchisement.”); id. at 369
(Katzmann, J., dissenting) (“Surely, the silence of enacting legislators cannot over-
come the unambiguous and broadly worded provisions of a statute that was meant
16
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In the next such claim subject to appellate review, the First Circuit
also found ambiguity in the legislative history of the VRA and joined the
Eleventh and Second Circuits in holding felon disenfranchisement laws
exempt from the VRA’s protections.81  In Simmons v. Galvin,82 incarcer-
ated felons challenged Massachusetts’s felon disenfranchisement provi-
sion under the VRA, claiming that past discrimination in the criminal
justice system resulted in the disproportionate disqualification of minori-
ties from voting.83  Like the Second Circuit, the First Circuit noted that
felon disenfranchisement provisions are presumptively constitutional, but
found that the VRA’s “broad and ambiguous” language allowed judicial
inquiry beyond the statute’s text.84  After reviewing the legislative history
of section 2 of the VRA, the 1982 amendments to the VRA, and post-1982
congressional actions assuming the validity of felon disenfranchisement
laws, the First Circuit concluded that “Congress has excepted from the
reach of the VRA protections from vote denial for claims against a state
which disenfranchises incarcerated felons.”85
to apply to a multitude of state policies not specifically enumerated in its text
. . . .”).  Notably, now-Justice Sotomayor stated in her separate dissenting opinion,
“I fear that the many pages of the majority opinion and concurrences . . . may give
the impression that this case is in some way complex.  It is not.” Id. at 367
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
81. See Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Con-
gress exempted felon disenfranchisement from reach of section 2), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 412 (2010).
82. 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 412 (2010).
83. See id. at 26 (discussing disparate impact claim under VRA).  In 2000, Mas-
sachusetts voters passed an amendment to the state’s constitution “to disqualify
currently incarcerated felons from voting in certain elections.” See id.
84. See id. at 32 (“[T]he state’s denial of the right to vote to felons has a con-
stitutional grounding.”); id. at 35 (“We agree with the Second Circuit that the lan-
guage of § 2(a) is both broad and ambiguous and that judicial interpretation of a
claim concerning felon disenfranchisement under the VRA may not be limited to
the text of § (2)(a) alone.”).
85. See id. at 41 (holding VRA does not extend to felon disenfranchisement
provisions).  Like the dissenters in Hayden, Judge Torruella faulted his fellow pan-
elists for misinterpreting the issue before the court, stating “this is not a case about
the state’s authority to disenfranchise convicted felons, nor about the popularity or
desirability of that practice.” See id. at 45-46 (Toruella, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“this is a case about interpreting a clearly worded congressional statute”).  Instead,
he argued that the VRA unambiguously applied to all voting qualifications that
have a discriminatory effect on the basis of race. See id. at 50 (“One need not delve
too deeply into the legislative history to discover that Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 pursuant to its powers to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment for
the ‘broad remedial purpose of rid[ding] the country of racial discrimination in
voting.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403
(1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Further, Judge Torruella stated that
the 1982 amendments to the VRA expanded the remedial power of the act “by
relieving plaintiffs of the burden of proving discriminatory intent.” Id. at 52.
17
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IV. FARRAKHAN V. GREGOIRE: LEGAL PING-PONG YIELDS DISPARATE
RESULTS AND THE REBIRTH OF INTENT
The Ninth Circuit further muddied section 2’s waters in 2003 when it
held that felon disenfranchisement laws with racially disparate effects
could be challenged under section 2 of the VRA.86  What renders the
Ninth Circuit’s decision of unique importance is not only its departure
from the predominant view of other circuits, but also its ultimate require-
ment of intentional discrimination.87  This requirement, wholly at odds
with the language of the Act and the Court’s totality of the circumstances
inquiry in vote dilution cases, only lends confusion to the already convo-
luted section 2 landscape.88
A. Another Challenger Takes to the Table
Minority citizens Muhammad Shabazz Farrakhan and his fellow plain-
tiffs lost their right to vote pursuant to Washington’s felon disenfranchise-
ment law.89  Together they filed a pro se lawsuit in federal district court,
alleging that “minorities are disproportionately prosecuted and sentenced,
resulting in their disproportionate representation among the persons dis-
enfranchised under the Washington Constitution.”90  As a result, the
plaintiffs argued that “Washington law causes vote denial and vote dilution
on the basis of race, in violation of the VRA, as well as direct violations of
the United States Constitution.”91
According to the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, African Americans in
Washington state were over nine times more likely to be incarcerated than
86. See Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d 1009, 1012-16 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that felon
disenfranchisement laws that deny right to vote in discriminatory manner may vio-
late VRA).
87. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s requirement of intentional discrim-
ination in Farrakhan I, see infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
88. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Farrakhan I, see infra
notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
89. See Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir.) (discussing factual back-
ground), aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc by 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam).  Washington’s constitution provided that “[a]ll persons convicted of infa-
mous crime unless restored to their civil rights and all persons while they are judi-
cially declared mentally incompetent are excluded from the elective franchise.”
WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (repealed 2010), held unconstitutional by Farrakhan II, 590
F.3d 989.  Washington law defines an “infamous crime” as one that is “punishable
by death in the state penitentiary or imprisonment in a state correctional facility.”
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.04.079 (2012).
90. Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (E.D. Wash. 1997) (reciting
factual and procedural background), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Farrakhan I,
338 F.3d 1009.
91. Id. (discussing factual and procedural background).  After the court dis-
missed the plaintiffs’ claims sua sponte for lack of standing, they amended the com-
plaint by adding Carl Maxey, an African-American registered voter, and asserting
claims under the VRA, as well as the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. See id.
18
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whites, despite a 3.72-to-1 arrest ratio for violent offenses.92  A study of the
Washington State Patrol revealed that Native Americans were more than
twice as likely as whites to be searched, African Americans were seventy
percent more likely, and Latinos were more than fifty percent more
likely.93  Further, reports indicated that racial differences in illegal behav-
ior did not warrant racial disparities in arrest rates.94
B. Farrakhan I Serves Challengers Well
The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss on the vote
dilution claim and granted the State’s motion for summary judgment on
the vote denial claim.95  The court found challenges to felon disen-
franchisement laws cognizable under section 2 of the VRA, but concluded
that the plaintiff’s evidence was “legally insufficient to establish causation
92. See Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1009 (noting plaintiffs’ compelling evidence
of discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system).
93. See id. at 1010 (discussing disparity in probability of search depending on
race).  A study of the Vancouver, Washington Police Department reflected similar
findings for traffic violations: despite the fact that searches of whites yield more
frequent seizures of contraband, African Americans were “nearly twice as likely to
be searched as Whites and Latino were three times more likely to be searched.” See
id.
94. See id. (discussing racial disparities in arrest rates).  “The Seattle Police
Department [ ] arrested African Americans and Latinos for drug possession at
rates much higher than their proportion among users.  Whites, on the other hand,
were arrested . . . at rates much lower than their proportion among users.” Id.
Reports also indicated racial disparities in charging and bail practices. See id.  Dr.
Crutchfield’s report found that whites were “less likely to have charges filed than
minorities,” and “[m]inority defendants were less likely to be released on their
own recognizance.” Id.  Further expert testimony attributed racial disparities in
drug possession and delivery arrests to three systemic practices: the police’s focus
on (1) crack cocaine, (2) outdoor drug venues, and (3) the downtown area. See id.
(discussing Dr. Beckett’s report on racial disparities in drug arrests in Seattle).  Dr.
Beckett found that these organizational practices “cannot be explained in race-
neutral terms.” See id.  (stating focus on crack could not be explained by frequency
of exchange, level of violence, or health problems associated with drug; “the focus
on outdoor drug activity cannot be explained by either greater citizen complaints
or greater yield from such arrests”; and focus on downtown was “out of proportion
to the level of drug crime there” and did not correspond to level of citizen
complaints).
95. See Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1313 (dismissing plaintiffs’ vote dilution
claim for failure to allege facts relevant to Gingles factors, including voter cohesive-
ness).  In allowing a challenge to the felon disenfranchisement statute under the
VRA, the district court held that the plain statement rule does not apply to the
VRA and that the VRA does not violate section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 1309-11.  Noting evidence “that African, Hispanic, and Native Americans
are targeted for prosecution of serious crimes and that they are over-represented
in prison populations,” the court stated that “[i]f true, Plaintiffs allegations may
establish a causal connection between Washington’s disenfranchisement scheme
and the denial of voting rights to racial minorities.” Id. at 1312.
19
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under the VRA” because “it is discrimination in the criminal justice system,
not the disenfranchisement provision itself, that causes any vote denial.”96
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit in Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan
I)97 reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the
plaintiff’s challenge to Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law was
cognizable under section 2 of the VRA and that evidence of discrimination
within the criminal justice system can be relevant to a section 2 analysis.98
The court stated that “a Section 2 ‘totality of the circumstances’ inquiry
requires courts to consider how a challenged voting practice interacts with
external factors such as ‘social and historical conditions’ to result in denial
of the right to vote on account of race or color.”99
C. Farrakhan II Nets Felons’ First Victory
Following remand, the parties again filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, and the district court granted the State’s motion.100  The court
found the plaintiffs’ expert testimony regarding racial bias in the criminal
justice system to be “compelling,” as well as “admissible, relevant, and per-
suasive.”101  Nevertheless, the district court held that “the totality of the
96. Farrakhan v. Locke, No. CS-96-76-RHW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212, at
*15, *17 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2000) (holding that plaintiffs’ evidence of discrimina-
tion in criminal justice system was compelling, but not sufficient to establish causal
link).
97. 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
98. See id. at 1016 (holding that “[f]elon disenfranchisement is a voting quali-
fication, and Section 2 is clear that any voting qualification that denies citizens the
right to vote in a discriminatory manner violates the VRA”).  The court also noted
that the district court’s “by itself” causation standard would “defeat the interactive
and contextual totality of the circumstances analysis repeatedly applied by [its]
sister circuits in Section 2 cases” and would effectively read an intent requirement
back into the VRA, “contradicti[ng] the clear command of the 1982 amendments
to section 2” of the VRA. See id. at 1018-19.
99. Id. at 1011-12 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).
The Ninth Circuit denied the defendant’s motion for rehearing en banc, but
Judge Kozinski offered a fervent dissent that foreshadowed the court’s ultimate
decision on the issue. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1116-18 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that court’s decision was contradic-
tory to precedent because plaintiffs’ case was “based entirely on statistical dispari-
ties”).  Ultimately, relying on legislative history, Judge Kozinski argued that the
VRA was never intended to reach felon disenfranchisement laws and expressed
concern that a contrary view would raise serious constitutional issues regarding the
scope of Congress’s enforcement power. See id. at 1120-21.  Noting that felon dis-
enfranchisement laws are presumptively constitutional, Judge Kozinski advocated
for a requirement of purposeful, invidious use of those laws to undermine constitu-
tionality. See id. at 1121.
100. See Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 WL 1889273, at *9
(E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006) (granting summary judgment to defendant), rev’d, 590
F.3d 989 (9th Cir.), aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc by 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.
2010) (per curiam).
101. Id. at *6 (stating that court was “compelled to find that there is discrimi-
nation in Washington’s criminal justice system on account of race,” and that such
discrimination “‘clearly hinder[s] the ability of racial minorities to participate ef-
20
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circumstances does not support a finding that Washington’s felon disen-
franchisement law results in discrimination in its electoral process on ac-
count of race.”102
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs demonstrated
that the discriminatory impact of Washington’s felon disenfranchisement
was attributable to racial discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice
system and that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law violated sec-
fectively in the political process, as disenfranchisement is automatic’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1020)).  The plaintiffs relied on the
reports of two expert witnesses: Dr. Robert Crutchfield, a professor of sociology at
the University of Washington, and Dr. Katherine Beckett, an associate professor of
sociology at the University of Washington. See id. at *5 nn.3-4.  Dr. Crutchfield’s
report reviewed empirical research conducted on racial and ethnic disparities in
various parts of Washington’s criminal justice system, including policing and inves-
tigation, prosecution, and sentencing. See id. at *5 (describing studies showing
that racial disparities in state’s criminal justice system could not be explained by
legitimate factors, such as higher level of involvement in criminal activity).  Crutch-
field offered two explanations for the reported racial disparities: “(1) discrimina-
tory actions of criminal justice decision makers (either intentional or
unconscious); and (2) structural or institutional causes (ways of doing business,
such as decision rules that are theoretically race-neutral, but are not race-neutral
in practice).” Id.  Additionally, the Crutchfield report contained evidence of “un-
warranted” racial disparities in rates of vehicle searches and “‘observable racial
differences’ in the processing of criminal cases (e.g., charging and bail recommen-
dations, lengths of confinement, and alternative sentencing.” See Farrakhan II, 590
F.3d at 994 (citation omitted).
Dr. Beckett’s report outlined the findings of her study on the “‘extent and
causes of racial disparity in Seattle drug [possession] and delivery arrests.’” Id. at
995 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The report noted:
(1) in Seattle, a majority of drug users are white (with the possible excep-
tion of users of crack cocaine); (2) in Seattle, a majority of those who
deliver “serious drugs” are white (with the possible exception of crack
cocaine); (3) 52.2 percent of those arrested for possession, and 64.2 per-
cent of those arrested for delivery of serious drugs in Seattle from January
1999-April 2001, were black; (4) Latinos are also over-represented among
those arrested for drug possession; and (5) this over-representation is pri-
marily the result of three factors: (A) law enforcement’s concentration on
the crack cocaine market; (B) law enforcement’s concentration on out-
door drug venues; and (C) the geographic focus on outdoor drug venues
in Seattle’s downtown area.
Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at *5.
102. Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at *9 (holding that statutory language re-
quires existence of discrimination in voting on broader scale).  The court ex-
plained that discrimination in the criminal justice system is just one factor to
consider in the totality of the circumstances and also that the remaining Senate
Factors weighed in favor of the state. See id. at *7.  While the court acknowledged
that many of those factors are not relevant to a vote denial claim, it found that
factors seven and eight were relevant and the plaintiffs failed to present “any evi-
dence on the extent to which minority group members have been elected to politi-
cal office in Washington or the level of responsiveness elected officials have to the
particularized needs of members of minority groups.” Id. at *8.  The court also
found that Senate Factor nine—whether the state’s policy justifications are “tenu-
ous”—also weighed in favor of the defendants, finding plaintiffs’ ability to examine
the validity of felon disenfranchisement laws “extremely limited” after the Su-
preme Court’s sanction of such laws. See id.
21
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tion 2 of the VRA.103  Importantly, the court determined that the “on ac-
count of” requirement may be satisfied “‘where the discriminatory impact
of a challenged voting practice is attributable to racial discrimination in
the surrounding social and historical circumstances,’ which include the
State’s criminal justice system,” thus reiterating its previous holding in Far-
rakhan I.104  The court noted that the plaintiffs introduced expert testi-
mony demonstrating that the statistical disparity and disproportionality in
Washington’s criminal justice system arose from discrimination and the
State failed to refute that showing with race-neutral explanations.105  The
court compared this method of proving discrimination to anti-discrimina-
tion jurisprudence in other areas.106  Accordingly, the court flatly rejected
the State’s argument that the plaintiffs failed to show discriminatory intent
or motive.107
103. See Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 999 (noting that law of case doctrine re-
quires reviewing court to follow appellate court’s decision on legal issues in same
case and also that contrary holdings of other circuits are not binding).  Elaborat-
ing on the circuit split, the court noted that the Sixth Circuit’s consideration of a
section 2 challenge to Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement law actually renders
the split more pronounced and invalidates any assumption that Farrakhan I can be
considered “clearly erroneous.” See id. at 1000.  The court rejected the district
court’s understanding of the Senate Factors and concluded that vote denial claims
allow “more flexibility in determining whether, under the totality of the circum-
stances test, a single factor is controlling and whether any weight may or should be
given to the presence or absence of others.” Id. at 1005.
104. Id. at 1009 (quoting Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1019-20).  The court distin-
guished between vote dilution and vote denial claims under section 2 of the VRA,
stating that vote dilution claims “‘implicate the value of aggregation,’” while vote
denial claims “‘implicate the value of participation.’” Id. at 1006 (quoting Tokaji,
supra note 56, at 718).  Therefore, according to the court, “the primary question in
such cases is not whether a ‘denial or abridgement’ occurs, but whether such de-
nial is ‘on account of race.’” Id.  The court rejected the district court’s application
of the Senate Factors and stressed that there is “no requirement that any particular
number of factors support a particular claim.” See id. at 1004-05 (quoting Gomez v.
City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir. 1988), for propositions that Sen-
ate Factors were “‘only meant as a guide to illustrate some of the variables that
should be considered by the court’” and “‘the range of factors that [are] relevant
in any given case will vary depending upon the nature of the claim and the facts of
the case’”)).
105. See id. at 1012 (“Unlike in Salt River, . . . Plaintiffs have produced evi-
dence that Washington’s criminal justice system is infected with racial bias.  The
experts’ conclusions are not ‘statistical disparity alone,’ but rather speak to a dura-
ble, sustained difference in treatment faced by minorities in Washington’s criminal
justice system–-systemic disparities which cannot be explained by ‘factors indepen-
dent of race.’”).
106. See id. at 1012-13 (“This method of proving racial discrimination is famil-
iar in our antidiscrimination jurisprudence.”).  Relying upon the three-step inquiry
required in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the court analogized discrimina-
tion in Washington’s criminal justice system to circumstances in which discrimina-
tory intent may be proven “through the same circumstantial inference from a lack
of race-neutral explanations.” See Farrakhan II, 590 U.S. at 1013.
107. See Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1012-13 (“‘[P]roof of discriminatory intent is
not required to establish a violation of Section 2.’” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179)).
22
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D. Rehearing Returns to Intent in Farrakhan III
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and re-
versed the panel’s decision that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement
law violated the VRA.108  The court held that plaintiffs bringing a section 2
challenge to a felon disenfranchisement law must show intentional dis-
crimination.109  The majority first acknowledged that three circuits found
felon disenfranchisement laws to be categorically exempt from challenges
brought under section 2 of the VRA.110  With these opinions in mind, the
majority concluded that “the rule announced in Farrakhan I sweeps too
broadly.”111  Like the First and Second Circuits, the majority looked be-
yond the text of the statute, noting that felon disenfranchisement laws
have a long history in the United States and that many such laws were in
effect when the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were ratified.112
Further, relying upon Richardson, the majority stated that “felon disen-
franchisement has an affirmative sanction in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”113  As additional grounds for skepticism that it is permissible to
challenge felon disenfranchisement laws under the VRA, the majority em-
phasized that the criminal justice system has “its own unique safeguards
and remedies against arbitrary, invidious or mistaken conviction.”114
Nevertheless, the court did not reverse its previous holding that it is
permissible to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws under section 2 of
Judge McKeown’s dissent recognized the circuit split on the initial question of
whether felon disenfranchisement laws may be challenged under the VRA, but
noted that “the wisdom of Farrakhan I is not within the purview of the panel to
reconsider here.” Id. at 1016 (McKeown, J., dissenting).  However, Judge McKe-
own expressed caution and identified a distinction between currently incarcerated
felons and those already released. See id. at 1017.  Judge McKeown also rejected
the majority’s distinction between vote dilution and vote denial claims, asserting
that the majority erred in disregarding certain Senate Factors. See id. at 1018-19.
108. See Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law did not violate VRA).
109. See id. (“Because plaintiffs presented no evidence of intentional discrimi-
nation in the operation of Washington’s criminal justice system . . . we conclude
that they didn’t meet their burden of showing a violation of the VRA.”).
110. See id. at 993 (noting circuit split).  For a discussion of the circuit split,
see supra notes 62-85 and accompanying text.
111. Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d at 993.
112. See id. (“These laws predate the Jim Crow era and, with a few notable
exceptions, have not been adopted based on racial considerations.” (citation
omitted)).
113. Id. (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)).  The majority also
acknowledged that when Congress enacted the VRA, it was aware of the language
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, yet did not indicate that felon dis-
enfranchisement laws were suspect. See id. (noting long history of felon disen-
franchisement laws and asserting that Congress was aware of these laws when it
enacted and amended VRA).
114. Id. (“By definition, felon disenfranchisement takes effect only after an
individual has been found guilty of a crime.”).
23
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the VRA.115  Instead, the majority held that plaintiffs “must at least show
that the criminal justice system is infected by intentional discrimination or
that the felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent.”116
Because the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion in the operation of Washington’s criminal justice system, the majority
concluded that they did not meet their burden to show a violation of sec-
tion 2 and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
State.117
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S UNAMBIGUOUS ERROR
In Farrakhan III, the Ninth Circuit properly upheld its previous hold-
ing that challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws are cognizable under
section 2 of the VRA.118  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit improperly ig-
nored both the plain language of the Act and established Supreme Court
precedent in requiring discriminatory intent to succeed on such a
claim.119  In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit erroneously relied
upon the legislative history of the VRA, the so-called “affirmative sanction”
115. See id. at 992 (“When this case was last before our court, we held that
felon disenfranchisement laws can be challenged under Section 2 by introducing
[statistical evidence that there are racial disparities in Washington’s criminal jus-
tice system].”).
116. Id. at 993 (limiting holding to narrow issue).
117. See id. at 994 (affirming district court’s holding that plaintiffs did not
show any violation of section 2 of VRA).  Four concurring judges agreed that the
majority’s holding did not overturn Farrakhan I’s holding that “a § 2 analysis re-
quires consideration of factors external to the challenged voting mechanism it-
self.” Id. at 995 (Thomas, J., concurring).  They also rejected the majority’s new
intent requirement. See id. at 996 (“I respectfully part company with the majority
to the extent that it suggests that proof of discriminatory intent is required to es-
tablish a § 2 violation.”).  Judge Graber concurred in the judgment, but disagreed
with the majority’s decision to alter its previous holding in Farrakhan I. See id. at
997 (Graber, J., concurring) (arguing that majority could have affirmed district
court’s holding on ground that plaintiffs failed totality of circumstances test).
Judge Graber found no need to address whether felon disenfranchisement laws
may be challenged under section 2 of the VRA because the court declined to re-
hear Farrakhan I en banc over a vigorous dissent and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. See id. (“Once we have resolved a preliminary and important point of
law and the full court and the Supreme Court have declined to intervene, judicial
prudence strongly suggests that we should not later disturb that ruling–-and
thereby undo years of effort by the parties and the courts–-in the very same case
when doing so is entirely unnecessary.”).
118. See id. at 992 (per curiam) (acknowledging that felon disenfranchise-
ment laws can be challenged under section 2 of VRA by introducing evidence of
racial disparities in criminal justice system); see also Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d 1009,
1012-16 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws cog-
nizable under section 2).
119. See Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d at 993 (per curiam) (requiring proof of inten-
tional discrimination).
24
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of felon disenfranchisement in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
“unique safeguards” of the criminal justice system.120
A. Congressional Silence Does Not Indicate Approval
The Ninth Circuit erred when it relied upon congressional silence in
the original enactment of the VRA and the 1982 amendments as evidence
of tacit approval of felon disenfranchisement.121  As a threshold matter,
many judges have rejected resorting to legislative history despite the plain
and unambiguous language of the VRA.122  As Judge Katzmann noted in a
dissenting opinion in Hayden, “Surely, the silence of enacting legislators
cannot overcome the unambiguous and broadly worded provisions of a
statute that was meant to apply to a multitude of state policies not specifi-
cally enumerated in its text . . . .”123  In addition, commentators have
noted that congressional silence on the applicability of the VRA to felon
disenfranchisement could point to the opposite conclusion—if Congress
did not intend the VRA to reach felon disenfranchisement, the congres-
sional record and floor debates would evince that objective.124
120. See id. (noting long history of felon disenfranchisement, legislative his-
tory, affirmative sanction of Fourteenth Amendment, and safeguards of criminal
justice system).
121. See id. (“Congress was no doubt aware of [felon disenfranchisement stat-
utes in twenty-nine states] when it enacted the VRA in 1965 and amended it in
1982, yet gave no indication that felon disenfranchisement was in any way
suspect.”).
122. See Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dis-
senting) (“Though it is unable to point to any actual textual ambiguity, the major-
ity nevertheless makes a conclusory assertion that ‘[t]he language of § 2(a) is both
broad and unambiguous.’  Breadth, however, does not render a statute ambigu-
ous.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 412 (2010);
Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 346 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Parker, Jr., J., dis-
senting) (“In order to justify its failure to apply the plain language of VRA § 2, the
majority must find ambiguity in that provision’s pellucid language.”); id. at 368
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Section 2 of the Act by its unambiguous terms sub-
jects felony disenfranchisement and all other voting qualifications to its cover-
age.”); id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (“I believe that this language of the Voting
Rights Act is facially unambiguous . . . .”); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d
1214, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“The language of
Section 2 of the VRA is unambiguous, and compels a conclusion that it applies to
felon disenfranchisement provisions.”); see also Matthew E. Feinberg, Suffering With-
out Suffrage: Why Felon Disenfranchisement Constitutes Vote Denial Under Section Two of
the Voting Rights Act, 8 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 61, 85 (2011) (“[U]nder
Supreme Court precedent, it is the plain meaning of the statute which controls the
analysis, and the plain meaning of the statute implies that Section Two of the Vot-
ing Rights Act applies to felon disenfranchisement.  It is therefore not permissible
to consider extrinsic information about the statute absent an ‘extraordinary show-
ing’ by Congress that Section Two does not apply to felon disenfranchisement.”
(footnote omitted)).
123. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 369 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (arguing that silence
cannot overcome plain meaning of statute).
124. See Feinberg, supra note 122, at 88 (“No member of Congress mentioned
felon disenfranchisement during the debate on the amendments, but there is sig-
nificant comment about how any voting test that results in racial discrimination
25
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B. Richardson Does Not Immunize Discriminatory Felon Disenfranchisement
Laws from Scrutiny
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit erred by relying upon Richardson for
the proposition that “felon disenfranchisement has an affirmative sanction
in the Fourteenth Amendment.”125  While lower courts may not quarrel
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Richardson, the tacit approval of a
facially neutral practice does not forever exempt that practice from chal-
lenge in its discriminatory forms.126  Justice Marshall’s dissent in Richard-
son best articulated this view that Congress did not immunize “from
evolving standards of equal protection scrutiny” all election practices to
which Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was inapplicable.127  The
would violate the statute.”); see also Simmons, 575 F.3d at 51-52 (Torruella, J., dis-
senting) (“The majority makes much of the fact that felon disenfranchisement was
not specifically mentioned in the legislative history, but ‘it would be a strange ca-
non of statutory construction that would require Congress to state in committee
reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face of a
statute.’  It is also illogical to interpret silence as intent to exclude, given that the
very purpose of § 2’s broad language was to avoid reciting the various maneuvers
that states may devise in the course of their ‘unremitting and ingenious defiance.’”
(quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966))); Hayden, 449 F.3d at 354 (Parker, Jr., J.,
dissenting) (“The majority’s use of silence is even worse than its use of floor de-
bates, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against drawing inferences
from silence.”); Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s
focus on the absence of congressional findings as to felon disenfranchisement, and
its disregard of the statutory text, eviscerates Congress’s intent to give Section 2 the
‘broadest possible scope.’” (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
567 (1969))).  Commentators have also noted that the congressional record of the
1982 amendments did not contemplate a per se ban on analogous voting practices
such as at-large elections, but considered such practices vulnerable if “ ‘in the total-
ity of the circumstances, they resulted in the denial of equal access to the pro-
cess.’” See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 122, at 89 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 16
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 193).
125. See Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d at 993 (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24, 54 (1974)).
126. See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 349-50 (Parker, Jr., J., dissenting) (“Richardson did
not grant felon disenfranchisement immunity against any other ground of invalid-
ity; it simply held that denying the vote to felons was not a per se violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . .  But because the ‘other crimes’ provision of § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not foreclose the Equal Protection challenge to Ala-
bama’s felon disenfranchisement law in Hunter, it necessarily follows that Congress
also has the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate potentially dis-
criminatory felon disenfranchisement statutes, as it did when it passed the VRA.”);
Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1241 (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[Section] 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not conflict with Congress’s at-
tempts to prohibit criminal disenfranchisement that is not racially neutral.”); see
also Feinberg, supra note 122, at 88 (arguing that Congress’s passage of facially
neutral felon disenfranchisement statute in District of Columbia in years following
enactment of original VRA does not prove Congress could not have intended to
include felon disenfranchisement within reach of VRA).
127. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 75-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
equal protection still applies); see also Simmons, 575 F.3d at 53 (Torruella, J., dis-
senting) (“The most that can be gleaned from this language is that by addressing
26
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Court’s decision in Hunter, invalidating a racially discriminatory felon dis-
enfranchisement provision, provides further evidence that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not contain a per se sanction of felon
disenfranchisement.128
C. Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice System Is Not a Safeguard
Finally, the Ninth Circuit erred in questioning the applicability of the
VRA to felon disenfranchisement laws on the ground that the criminal
justice system has “its own unique safeguards” against mistaken convic-
tion.129  The faulty logic of this proposition ignores the underlying theory
the eventuality of ‘abridg[ment] . . . for participation in . . . crime,’ Congress con-
templated that at least in some circumstances, felon disenfranchisement could ex-
ist.  Thus, it merely implies that there is no per se ban on such laws.” (alteration in
original)); Hayden, 449 F.3d at 345 (Parker, Jr., J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that
felon disenfranchisement statutes may sometimes be constitutional does not mean
they are always constitutional.”); id. at 365 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“The fact that
race-neutral felon disenfranchisement is permissible under § 4(c) tells us nothing
at all about whether § 2 allows racially discriminatory felon disenfranchisement.”);
Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1248 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s finding of a
conflict between the VRA and Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment stems from
its failure to distinguish between felon disenfranchisement laws generally and
those that result in racial discrimination.”).
128. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding that Alabama
felon disenfranchisement law violated Equal Protection Clause because desire to
discriminate against blacks on account of race motivated original enactment and
law continues to have such effect); see also Hayden, 449 F.3d at 349 (Parker, Jr., J.,
dissenting) (“Unquestionably, Richardson did not authorize the use of felon disen-
franchisement for discrimination, as the Supreme Court made clear in Hunter v.
Underwood.” (citation omitted)).  Further, given the pitched argument regarding
the proper interpretation of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in relation
to the VRA, some commentators have emphasized the fact that Congress enacted
the VRA pursuant to its power under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments. See id. at 350 (“The majority fails to appreciate that the operative provisions
of the VRA were enacted pursuant to Congress’s power under the Fifteenth
Amendment.  Moreover, when it added the results test of VRA § 2 in 1982, Con-
gress invoked its powers to enforce by ‘appropriate legislation’ both the Fifteenth
Amendment’s guarantee that no citizen will be denied the right to vote on account
of race and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of racial equality.” (citations
omitted)); Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1242 (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“Congress enacted the VRA pursuant to the enforcement clauses of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in response to rampant violations of the
right to vote.”).
129. See Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d at 993 (“By definition, felon disenfranchise-
ment takes effect only after an individual has been found guilty of a crime.  This
determination is made by the criminal justice system, which has its own unique
safeguards and remedies against arbitrary, invidious or mistaken conviction.”).
This justification parallels the Sixth Circuit’s similarly myopic conclusion in Wesley
that felons are not disenfranchised because of an immutable characteristic such as
race, but because of “their conscious decision to commit a criminal act for which
they assume the risks of detention and punishment.”  Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d
1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussing rationale for felon disenfranchisement
laws); see also, Jerald, supra note 23, at 178-79 (arguing that racial discrimination in
criminal justice system is hard to prove because “[o]ther considerations [ ] could
explain the disproportionate felony impact on minorities,” including “the felon’s
27
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of the challengers’ claim, to wit, racial bias in the criminal justice system
results in the disproportionate impact of felon disenfranchisement.130
The plaintiffs submitted ample evidence that the criminal justice system
did not adequately contain safeguards against “arbitrary, invidious or mis-
taken conviction.”131  Moreover, a body of commentary identifies the
criminal justice system not as a solution to the problem posed by felon
disenfranchisement, but the problem itself.132
socioeconomic status, prior criminal record, severity of the offense, strength of
evidence presented against him, quality of legal representation, and/or the age of
the felon”). But see Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989, 1014 (9th Cir.) (“Before one who
commits a criminal act becomes a felon, however, numerous other decisions must
be made by State actors. . . .  If those decision points are infected with racial bias,
resulting in some people becoming felons not just because they have committed a
crime, but because of their race, then that felon status cannot, under § 2 of the
VRA, disqualify felons from voting.”), aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc by 623
F.3d 990.  For a discussion of the racial bias in the criminal justice system, see supra
notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
130. See Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (E.D. Wash. 1997) (ac-
knowledging claim that “minorities are disproportionately prosecuted and sen-
tenced, resulting in their disproportionate representation among the persons
disenfranchised under the Washington Constitution”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
131. Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d at 993; see Farrakhan v. Gregoire, No. CV-96-076-
RHW, 2006 WL 1889273, at *6-9 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006) (stating that court was
“compelled to find that there is discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice
system on account of race,” and that such discrimination “‘clearly hinder[s] the
ability of racial minorities to participate effectively in the political process, as disen-
franchisement is automatic’” (quoting Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1020)), rev’d, 590
F.3d 989, aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc by 623 F.3d 990.
132. See Chin, supra note 31, at 254 (“The tainted history of drug prosecutions
and use of collateral consequences as a technique of racial discrimination is troub-
ling in the context of the modern criminal justice system.  For all categories of
crime, the best evidence of discriminatory prosecution exists for drug violations;
while African Americans are not more likely to commit drug crimes than members
of other races, they are much more likely to be arrested, prosecuted, convicted,
and sentenced to prison.”); Mauer, supra note 6, at 248 (discussing decline in num-
ber of potential voters due to combined impact of criminal justice policies and
felon disenfranchisement laws); Rudovsky, supra note 30, at 101 (“The problem of
racial discrimination in the criminal justice system is stark and seemingly impervi-
ous to change.  Young African-American men bear the brunt of the system’s injus-
tices during a period in which the nation has moved to a process of mass
incarceration.”); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 100 (discussing racially dis-
criminatory motive behind War on Drugs and Supreme Court precedent granting
police and prosecutors broad discretion and protection from scrutiny for racial
bias).  Alexander explains that a formally colorblind criminal justice system
achieves shocking racially discriminatory results in two stages:
The first step is to grant law enforcement officials extraordinary discre-
tion regarding whom to stop, search, arrest, and charge for drug offenses,
thus ensuring that conscious and unconscious racial beliefs and stereo-
types will be given free reign.  Unbridled discretion inevitably creates
huge racial disparities.  Then, the damning step: Close the courthouse
doors to all claims by defendants and private litigants that the criminal
justice system operates in racially discriminatory fashion.
ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 100.
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VI. A TEST WITH CLEAR RESULTS
Supporters of the Ninth Circuit’s novel evidentiary standard under
section 2 of the VRA may validly point to the fact that no previous court
had articulated a clear interpretation of the VRA’s results test.133  This
Part asserts that the appropriate standard for evaluating claims under sec-
tion 2 of the VRA incorporates the plain language of the results test with a
burden-shifting scheme familiar under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.134  Under this stan-
dard, Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law would fail.135
A. The Codified Results Test
In 1982, Congress amended section 2 of the VRA and explicitly re-
jected Bolden’s intentional discrimination requirement.136  The plain lan-
guage of section 2 prohibits any voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting that results in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on ac-
count of race or color.137 Further, Congress codified many of the factors
that the Court had considered as part of its totality of the circumstances
inquiry in Whitcomb and White.138  As subsequently interpreted by the Su-
preme Court in Gingles, “[t]he essence of a [section] 2 claim is that a cer-
tain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black
and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”139  The court
133. See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Right Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 656
(2006) (noting that “[t]he nature of Section 2 litigation has changed in recent
years” and that most challenges involved at-large elections).  Only a small number
of cases involved vote denial claims such as challenges to registration practices,
candidacy, voting requirements, or other practices such as annexations and felon
disenfranchisement. See Tokaji, supra note 56, at 709 (noting that majority of sec-
tion 2 cases address issues of vote dilution, as opposed to vote denial).
134. See generally Tokaji, supra note 56, at 723-26 (suggesting “new vote denial
test” modeled on disparate impact test of Title VII and borrowing from jury dis-
crimination cases under Equal Protection Clause).
135. For a discussion of why Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law
would not survive under the proposed standard, see infra note 167.
136. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
179 (“This amendment is designed to make clear that proof of discriminatory in-
tent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2.  It thereby restores the
legal standards, based on the controlling Supreme Court precedents, which ap-
plied in voting discrimination claims prior to the litigation involved in Mobile v.
Bolden.”).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
138. Compare S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (discussing relevant factors), with
White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973) (considering several factors in total-
ity of circumstances), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-55 (1971) (same).
For a discussion of the Senate Factors, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text.
139. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (emphasis added).
29
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properly relied upon this same standard in assessing the plaintiffs’ vote
denial claim in Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan II).140
While some debate whether the prevention of intentional discrimina-
tion was the core value underlying section 2 of the VRA, the 1982 amend-
ments established an impact-based standard to achieve its ultimate
purpose.141  Congress’s primary focus on vote dilution, not vote denial
claims, likely explains why Congress did not explicitly adopt a disparate
impact test.142  Nevertheless, the results test remains applicable to vote
denial claims, albeit in a simplified form that does not require a showing
of the Gingles preconditions or a certain number of the Senate Factors.143
140. 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.), aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc by 623 F.3d
990 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see id. at 1009 (“[T]he ‘on account of’ require-
ment may be met ‘where the discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice
is attributable to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical cir-
cumstances,’ which include the state’s criminal justice system.” (quoting Farrakhan
I, 338 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003))).
141. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (“[T]he ultimate test would be . . . whether,
in the particular situation, the practice operated to deny the minority plaintiff an
equal opportunity to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.”); see also
Tokaji, supra note 56, at 720 (“While Senator Hatch was correct to identify the
prevention of intentional discrimination as the core value underlying Section 2, he
was wrong to rule out an impact-based legal standard as a way of getting at that
core value.  An impact-based test may serve as a prophylactic against intentional
discrimination that might otherwise seep into the voting process undetected.”
(footnote omitted)). But see S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15-19 (discussing absence-of-
intent requirement in original legislative intent of section 2).  Additionally, some
commentators have downplayed the distinction between requirements of discrimi-
natory intent and discriminatory effect. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in
Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1136 (1989) (“The intent doctrine has
come to resemble Title VII in both focus and structure.  In many contexts, it too
centers on outcome, rather than input, and it too weighs the claims of both sides
through its allocation of the burden of proof between the parties.”); George
Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of
Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2320 (2006) (“Concrete issues of proof, more
than any abstract theory, reveal the fundamental similarity between claims of in-
tentional discrimination and those of disparate impact.”).
142. See Tokaji, supra note 56, at 720 (discussing difference between vote dilu-
tion and vote denial claims and Congress’s focus on vote dilution during 1982
amendments).  Additionally, Tokaji notes that Congress avoided explicitly adopt-
ing a disparate impact test to assuage concerns that courts would read section 2 to
require proportional representation. See id. at 722. But see S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6
(“The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an
absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.”).
143. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 394 (1991) (“[P]laintiffs can prevail
under § 2 by demonstrating that a challenged election practice has resulted in the
denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on color or race.”); Farrakhan II,
590 F.3d at 1006 (“[T]he primary question in such cases is not whether a ‘denial or
abridgement’ occurs, but whether such denial is ‘on account of race.’  In vote de-
nial claims brought under the ‘results test,’ the ‘on account of’ element is proved
by showing that a ‘discriminatory impact . . . is attributable to racial discrimination
in the surrounding social and historical circumstances. . . .  Given the analytical
distinction between vote dilution and vote denial, it is clear that Senate Factors 7
and 8, while relevant to the former, are of lesser relevance to a vote denial claim.”
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); see also Tokaji, supra
30
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The disproportionate denial of minority votes, without more, establishes
that a particular practice has a dilutive effect and leaves remaining the
issue of whether there is a causal connection between the disproportion-
ate effect and surrounding social and historical circumstances.144  While
the Ninth Circuit in Farrakhan II appeared to end its inquiry upon such a
showing, consideration of the Court’s anti-discrimination jurisprudence
indicates that the results test may require an additional step.145
B. The Court’s Disparate Impact Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s results-based anti-discrimination law places the
burden on defendants to justify allegedly discriminatory conduct after the
plaintiff shows disparate impact.146  Notably, Title VII, enacted one year
before the VRA and with a similarly broad purpose of ridding discrimina-
tion in employment, adopts a results-based test for plaintiffs challenging
employment practices with a disparate impact on members of a protected
class.147  Under Title VII, once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of dis-
note 56, at 721 (stating that courts need not rely on circumstantial evidence where
there is direct evidence of vote denial that disproportionately denies minority
votes). But see Feinberg, supra note 122, at 94-98 (outlining “modified Gingles test”
that integrates concepts of power, cohesion, and submergence).
144. See Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1009 (noting that felon disenfranchisement
is automatic and “sole remaining issue is causation”).
145. See id. at 1016 (“Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the discriminatory im-
pact of Washington’s felon disenfranchisement is attributable to racial discrimina-
tion in Washington’s criminal justice system; thus, that Washington’s felon
disenfranchisement law violates § 2 of the VRA.”).  However, the Ninth Circuit al-
luded to a burden-shifting scheme that tracked other anti-discrimination jurispru-
dence. See id. at 1012-13 (“Plaintiffs’ evidence suggests not only that Washington’s
criminal justice system adversely affects minorities to a greater extent than non-
minorities, but also that this differential effect cannot be explained by factors
other than racial discrimination.  This method of proving racial discrimination is
familiar in our antidiscrimination jurisprudence.”).
146. See generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (holding
that Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 also creates disparate impact
claim); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 448 (1975) (remanding case
to district court to determine whether pre-employment testing program with dispa-
rate impact on African Americans was sufficiently job-related “measured against
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s guidelines”); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII of Civil Rights Act prohibited
employer from requiring high school education or passing standardized intelli-
gence test as condition to employment where requirements disproportionately dis-
qualified African-American applicants and employer failed to show significant
relation to successful job performance); see also Rutherglen, supra note 141 (dis-
cussing evolution of burden of proof in disparate impact claims under Title VII
and other civil rights statutes, including Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).
147. See H.R. DOC. NO. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391, 2393 (“Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation, Ne-
groes, who make up over 10 percent of our population, are by virtue of one or
another type of discrimination not accorded the rights, privileges, and opportuni-
ties which are considered to be, and must be, the birthright of all citizens. . . .  [I]n
the last decade it has become increasingly clear that progress has been too slow
31
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parate impact, the defendant employer may offer evidence that the chal-
lenged practice constitutes a business necessity.148  Comparably, at least
one judge has argued that defendants under section 2 of the VRA have the
burden to prove the electoral necessity of the challenged practice.149
Similarly, the Court’s anti-discrimination jurisprudence, particularly
in jury selection, allows a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of pur-
poseful discrimination where the challenging party’s race was substantially
and that national legislation is required to meet a national need . . . .  A number of
provisions of the Constitution of the United States clearly supply the means ‘to
secure these rights,’ and H.R. 7152 . . . is designed as a step toward eradicating
significant areas of discrimination on a nationwide basis.  It is general in applica-
tion and national in scope.”); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-32 (“The objective of
Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute.  It
was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. . . .  Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”); Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office
of the City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 334 (3d Cir. 1994)
(Lewis, J., dissenting) (“Given the similarities between [Title VII and section 2 of
the VRA], it is not surprising that in Griggs, the Supreme Court relied on a Voting
Rights Act case in first explaining how and why Title VII prohibited the sort of
discrimination challenged in a disparate-impact suit.” (citation omitted)); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 711-12 (3d ed. 2006)
(comparing Title VII and VRA based on absence of discriminatory purpose re-
quirement); Rutherglen, supra note 141, at 2317 (discussing similarities between
Title VII of Civil Rights Act and section 2 of VRA). See generally BUREAU OF NAT’L
AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY;
WHAT IT MEANS TO EMPLOYERS, BUSINESSMEN, UNIONS, EMPLOYEES, MINORITY
GROUPS (1964) (discussing far-reaching significance of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
148. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“The touchstone is business necessity.  If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”).  Congress codified Griggs’
disparate impact standard and the business necessity defense in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 which provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is estab-
lished under this subchapter only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Rutherglen, supra
note 141, at 2317 (noting that after 1991 amendments to Title VII, “the defendant
has both the burden of production and persuasion to establish that an employ-
ment practice with disparate impact is ‘job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity’” (quoting § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i))).
149. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 333-35 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (arguing that voter-
purge statute should only be permitted if necessary to achieve stated public inter-
est under section 2 of VRA).  Judge Lewis noted that “if a state or local government
can show that a voting practice that operates to the disadvantage of minority regis-
trants is necessary to run a valid election, that practice would not constitute a viola-
tion of § 2,” and, “[c]onsistent with other results-based anti-discrimination law,
defendants should bear the burden of proving necessity once plaintiffs establish
the existence of disparate impact.” Id. at 334.
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underrepresented on the venire.150  After the challenging party makes a
prima facie showing, “the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a
neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.”151  Likewise, in the
landmark equal protection case of Washington v. Davis,152 the Court re-
quired the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action after
noting that a discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of
circumstances, including “the fact . . . that the law bears more heavily on
one race than another.”153  Nevertheless, the Court in Washington cau-
tioned: “Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Consti-
tution.”154  Disproportionate impact alone is not enough to prove pur-
150. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (discussing inference of
discrimination in absence of African-American citizens on jury).  In Batson, the
Court stated that to establish a prima facie case,
[t]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable ra-
cial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges
to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race.  Second, the
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no
dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice
that permits “those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.”
Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.  This
combination of factors . . . raises the necessary inference of purposeful
discrimination.
Id. at 96 (citation omitted) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
151. Id. at 97.
152. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
153. See id. at 242 (discussing inference of discrimination from disparate im-
pact on one race).  Relying on the jury selection cases, the Court stated that upon
a prima facie showing of discrimination on the basis of race, “ ‘the burden of proof
shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing
that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced
the monochromatic result.’” Id. at 241 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 632 (1972)); cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) (“Once racial
discrimination is shown to have been a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind
enactment of the law, the burden shifts to the law’s defenders to demonstrate that
the law would have been enacted without this factor.”).  If the Court accepts the
government’s justification, it will apply rational basis review, but if the Court is
persuaded that there is a discriminatory purpose, it will invalidate the law. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 147, at 718.
154. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.  The Court continued: “Standing alone, [dispro-
portionate impact] does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be
subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of con-
siderations.” Id. (citation omitted).  Further, the Court rejected the more rigorous
analysis of Title VII, noting a host of constitutional issues that would follow from
“tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more
burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.”
See id. at 248.  The Court soon clarified its holding in Davis, listing a series of fac-
tors to consider when determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977) (stating that circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
may follow from historical background of decision, specific sequence of events
leading to challenged decision, substantive departures from normal procedure,
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poseful discrimination in a facially neutral statute, however all explicit
classifications on the basis of race remain subject to strict scrutiny and
defendants maintain the burden of showing that the discrimination is nec-
essary and narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.155  Additionally, the
Court has applied strict scrutiny to voting cases where the challenged prac-
tice poses “severe” restrictions on the right to vote.156
C. A New Results Test
Combining the business necessity defense of Title VII with the bur-
den-shifting of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, it is apparent
that a similar burden-shifting scheme is appropriate under section 2 of the
VRA.157  Under such a test, the plaintiffs would have the burden of show-
and legislative and administrative history).  In Arlington Heights, the Court first
noted:
The impact of the official action whether it “bears more heavily on one
race than another” may provide an important starting point.  Sometimes
a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears
neutral on its face.
Id. at 266 (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 242).
155. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (“There are
two prongs to this examination. First, any racial classification ‘must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest.’  Second, the means chosen by the State to ef-
fectuate its purpose must be ‘narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.’”
(citations omitted) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980))); Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432-33 (“Such classifi-
cations are subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster,
they must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be ‘neces-
sary . . . to the accomplishment’ of their legitimate purpose.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964))).
156. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (holding that state’s
prohibition on write-in voting does not impose unconstitutional burdens on First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights).  Elucidating the appropriate standard of re-
view for restrictions on the right to vote, the Court adopted a balancing test:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh “the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindi-
cate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifica-
tions for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights.” . . .  [W]e have recognized when those rights are subjected to
“severe” restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a
state interest of compelling importance.”
Id. at 434 (citations omitted).
157. See Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989, 1012-13 (9th Cir.) (“This method of prov-
ing racial discrimination is familiar in our antidiscrimination jurisprudence.”),
aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc by 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam);
Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d
306, 334 (3d Cir. 1994) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (“[C]onsistent with other results-
based anti-discrimination law, defendants should bear the burden of proving ne-
cessity once plaintiffs establish the existence of a disparate impact.”); see also Fein-
berg, supra note 122, at 96 (proposing modified Gingles test for section 2 claims
that includes burden shift to state to show compelling interest and narrowed tailor-
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ing that “a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social
and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities en-
joyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”158
The test would require plaintiffs to show both a disparate impact on mi-
nority voters and a causal connection with social and historical condi-
tions.159  The appropriate causal connection would be a contributing
cause, not a dispositive force.160
For example, in a challenge to a felon disenfranchisement law, plain-
tiffs would first show a disparate impact on minority voters.161  Second,
they would show that racial bias in the criminal justice system contributed
to the disproportionate disenfranchisement of minority voters.162  Upon
such a prima facie showing, the burden would shift to the defendant to
show that the practice is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.163
Consistent with the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to racial discrimi-
nation and fundamental rights, to be narrowly tailored, the practice must
have a race-neutral explanation or the defendant must have considered
ing); Tokaji, supra note 56, at 725 (applying burden-shift scheme to section 2 of
VRA).
158. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986); see also Tokaji, supra note
56, at 724 (deriving test from “ultimate test” in Senate Report—“whether, in the
particular situation, the practice operated to deny the minority plaintiff an equal
opportunity to participate and to elect candidates of their . . . choice”—and fifth
Senate Factor—“the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-417, at 29-30 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07)).
159. See Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1009 (“[T]he ‘on account of’ requirement
may be met ‘where the discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is
attributable to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical cir-
cumstances’ . . . .” (quoting Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d 1009, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2003))).
160. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 323 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (“In order to properly
apply § 2 in this case, we cannot require the plaintiffs to prove that Pennsylvania’s
non-voting purge law operates, by itself and independently of other circumstances,
to produce discriminatory results.”); see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 n.114
(“Where these conditions are shown, and where the level of black participation in
politics is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any further causal nexus between
their disparate socio-economic status and the depressed level of political
participation.”).
161. See Tokaji, supra note 56, at 724 (discussing first prong of prima facie
case).
162. See id. (discussing second prong of prima facie case).
163. See id. at 725-26 (relying on additional Senate Factor—“whether the pol-
icy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification,
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous”—and argu-
ing that “government should be required to show the challenged practice is nar-
rowly tailored to a compelling government interest” (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-417, at
29)); see also Rutherglen, supra note 141, at 2314 (arguing that application of dispa-
rate impact analysis is heavily dependent upon context).  For a discussion of justifi-
cations asserted in defense of felon-disenfranchisement statues, see supra note 29
and accompanying text.
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race-neutral alternatives first.164  For example, in the context of felon dis-
enfranchisement, a state would have to show that there is a race-neutral
explanation for the disparate effects in the criminal justice system, not just
that the law itself is facially race-neutral.165  To require otherwise would
undermine section 2’s focus on discriminatory effect rather than discrimi-
natory intent.166  Because the Ninth Circuit in Farrakhan II required a sim-
ilar prima facie showing and noted the absence of any race-neutral
justification by the State for disparities in the criminal justice system, it is
clear that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law would fail the above
test.167
VII. FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE COLORBLIND COURT
Given the convoluted legal landscape, the growing concern for the
collateral consequences of mass incarceration, and the interest in the po-
litical ramifications of felon disenfranchisement, the issue is ripe for Su-
164. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)
(invalidating city’s affirmative action contracting plan because “there does not ap-
pear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase
minority business participation in city contracting”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Unquestionably we have held that a government practice or statute which
restricts ‘fundamental rights’ or which contains ‘suspect classifications’ is to be
subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling
government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is
available.”).
165. See Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989, 1012 (9th Cir.) (distinguishing Salt River
on ground that “experts’ conclusions are not ‘statistical disparity alone,’ but rather
speak to a durable, sustained difference in treatment faced by minorities in Wash-
ington’s criminal justice system-–systemic disparities which cannot be explained by
‘factors independent of race’”), aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc by 623 F.3d 990
(9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  For further discussion of race-neutrality, see supra
notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
166. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15-16 (noting that original legislative intent as
to section 2 did not require discriminatory intent or purpose); see also Farrakhan I,
338 F.3d 1009, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that district court’s “ ‘by itself’ cau-
sation [standard] would defeat the interactive and contextual totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis repeatedly applied by [ ] sisters circuits in Section 2 cases” and
effectively read intent requirement back into VRA, contradicting clear command
of 1982 amendments to section 2 of VRA).
167. See Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1004 (“Have Plaintiffs demonstrated a prima
facie case that the felon disenfranchisement law violates § 2 of the VRA, i.e., that:
(1) there are significant statistical racial disparities in the operation of the criminal
justice system; (2) those disparities cannot be explained in race-neutral ways; and
(3) those non-race-neutral disparities in the criminal justice system lead to signifi-
cant racial disparities in the qualification to vote, such that Plaintiffs would be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the uncontroverted evi-
dence?”).  The Ninth Circuit repeatedly noted that the plaintiffs introduced evi-
dence and expert testimony “demonstrating that the statistical disparity and
disproportionality evident in Washington’s criminal justice system ar[o]se from
discrimination, and the State has failed to refute that showing.” See id. at 1012.
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preme Court review.168  Its intervention would resolve the circuit split on
the threshold issue of challenges to felon disenfranchisement under sec-
tion 2 of the VRA.169  It would also allow the Court to consider the appro-
priate evidentiary standard under section 2 and clarify the relationship of
the results test to recent vote denial claims.170  As such, the fate of future
challenges to felon disenfranchisement waits in the balance.171
While the Court could defer to the tenuous reasoning of the majority
of circuit courts to address the issue, it should seize the opportunity to
recognize racial bias in the criminal justice system and the devastating ef-
fect of mass incarceration on communities of color.172  If it chooses to do
so, the above standard, in explicitly acknowledging the State’s opportunity
to rebut a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, provides further
constitutional protection to section 2 of the VRA by satisfying the congru-
ence and proportionality requirements of Congress’s enforcement pow-
ers.173  To allay fears that the results test invalidates all felon
168. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 10-11 (“More recently, civil rights groups
around the country have helped to launch legal attacks and vibrant grassroots cam-
paigns against felon disenfranchisement laws and have strenuously opposed dis-
criminatory crack sentencing laws and guidelines, as well as ‘zero tolerance’
policies that effectively funnel youth of color from schools to jails.”); see also Tokaji,
supra note 56, at 689 (“The years since the 2000 presidential election have wit-
nessed unprecedented attention to the mechanics of election administration.”).
169. For a discussion of the circuit split, see supra notes 62-85 and accompany-
ing text.
170. For a discussion of the appropriate evidentiary standard, see supra notes
133-67 and accompanying text.
171. See Ryan P. Haygood, Disregarding the Results: Examining the Ninth Circuit’s
Heightened Section 2 “Intentional Discrimination” Standard in Farrakhan v. Gregoire,
111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51, 65 (2011) (“The ironic and disheartening result of
all this . . . is that Washington’s disproportionately disfranchised racial minorities
are left with only one hope for change: to rely on the same political process that
has already cast them out.”).
172. For a discussion of appellate decisions rejecting challenges to felon dis-
enfranchisement under section 2 of the VRA, see supra notes 62-85 and accompa-
nying text.
173. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end.”); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 736 (2004) (holding that because Family Medical Leave Act targeted
sex-based classifications, subject to heightened standard of review, legislature
granted more deference in prophylactic legislation); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509, 528-29 (2004) (noting heightened judicial scrutiny applied to constitutional
guarantees such as access to courts eases Congress’s burden in showing pattern of
constitutional violations to justify prophylactic legislation).  Because Congress en-
acted section 2 to address racial discrimination in the exercise of a fundamental
right, according to Lane and Hibbs, courts should grant Congress more deference
in enacting prophylactic or remedial legislation. See Tokaji, supra note 56, at 729.
But see Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1230-31 (11th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (stating that plaintiff’s interpretation that VRA conflicts with Fourteenth
Amendment raises serious constitutional issues because enforcement power does
not allow prohibition of constitutionally protected practices); Farrakhan v. Wash-
ington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that
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disenfranchisement laws with a disparate impact on racial minorities, the
proposed standard would only reach laws that are discriminatory due to
social and historical circumstances.174
The test outlined above, in addition to its solid foundation in the text
of the VRA and Supreme Court precedent, will force the Court and states
to consider the effect of a growing civil rights outrage.175  In an effort to
remain colorblind, the Court has been reluctant to open the door to chal-
lenges of racial bias in the criminal justice system; however, Congress has
acknowledged that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments failed to
eliminate invidious forms of racial discrimination.176  It is not for the
Court to reject this legislative purpose, especially in a time when a much
more insidious form of racial discrimination has taken hold across the
country.177  For those like Jarvious Cotton and Mohammad Farrakhan,
colorblindness will not remedy the loss of their most fundamental right,
but will only submerge and obscure the racial disparities that persist in
society.178
subjecting felon disenfranchisement to section 2 would violate Congress’s enforce-
ment powers because “[t]he theoretical, undocumented threat of unconstitutional
felon disenfranchisement laws simply doesn’t justify such a broad remedy”).
174. For a discussion of the prima facie case, see supra notes 158-62 and ac-
companying text.
175. For a discussion of the proposed burden-shifting scheme, see supra notes
157-67 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the racial bias in the War on
Drugs and the increased incarceration of minorities, see ALEXANDER, supra note 1,
at 20-57.
176. See A Bill to Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States: Hearing on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2 (1965)
(statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the U.S.) (“While, in theory,
the [Fifteenth] Amendment devitalizes these techniques, in fact, they flourish.  It is
now apparent that its promise is yet to be redeemed, and that Congress must meet
the obligation, expressly conferred by the Amendment, to enforce its provisions.
The purpose of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is to meet that obligation.”).
177. For further discussion of racial bias in the criminal justice system, see
supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
178. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 228 (“Our blindness also prevents us
from seeing the racial and structural divisions that persist in society: the segre-
gated, unequal schools, the segregated jobless ghettos, and the segregated public
discourse-–a public conversation that excludes the current pariah caste.”).
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